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31 October 1959

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

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#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

*OK*  
Bloc-Balkans: The Soviet bloc may be planning to renew its bid for a conference of Balkan countries to consider the bloc's scheme for a Balkan-Adriatic atom- and rocket-free zone and related proposals. Bloc leaders are probably aware that Turkey expects shortly to announce its acceptance of NATO missile bases. While they probably would not expect a conference bid to be accepted by nonbloc countries, they may calculate that such a bid, coming just before any Turkish announcement, would further "justify" countermeasures such as siting of Soviet missile bases in the Balkan satellites. [REDACTED]

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*OK*  
Eastern Europe: A serious drought in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany has been hampering fall sowing and will jeopardize the winter wheat and rye crops, which account for over half of all the grain produced in these countries. Poland already faces a decline in public morale because of a shortage of meat and other foods. All three countries will probably have to increase substantially their normally heavy imports of grain and fodder. [REDACTED]

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Berlin: East German authorities have plans to display the new East German flag on all elevated railway stations in West Berlin on 7 November, and to organize goon squads to resist the expected police action to remove the banners, [REDACTED]

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*NO*  
A one- or two-day suspension of elevated service in West Berlin is also planned if the flags are torn down. These plans are said to be still subject to Soviet approval, however, and any displays may be limited to flags on moving trains and in relatively inaccessible installations in order to uphold East German prestige without risking serious disorders. [REDACTED]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Ceylon: Although Parliament defeated a motion of no confidence in the Dahanayake government by a margin of 48 to 43 on 30 October, the government remains in a vulnerable position because of serious cabinet dissension and charges implicating top officials in the Bandaranaike assassination. The continued unwillingness of certain opposition leftists to face elections in the near future apparently is the key factor in enabling Dahanayake to remain in office. [REDACTED]

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Iraq-Iran: Iraqi troop movements on 27 October south from Basra along the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-Arab appear to have resulted from Iraqi fear of possible Iranian military action in that area. Continuing efforts by Iran to get negotiations started with Iraq on the long-standing dispute regarding sovereignty over the river and regulation of navigation therein have been unsuccessful. On 23 and 24 October, in defiance of warnings by Iraqi port authorities, Iran moved ships under naval escort to and from the Iranian port of Khosroabad. On 29 October, however, an Iranian Foreign Ministry official stated that the situation was quiet along the river; he indicated that while his government would "stand firm," it would be ready for negotiations whenever the Iraqis were willing. [REDACTED]

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## III. THE WEST

31 Oct 59

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Bloc May Renew Bid for Balkan Summit Conference

Recent events suggest that bloc leaders are planning to renew their bid for a summit conference of the Balkan-Adriatic countries to consider the Soviet scheme for a "zone of peace" in which atomic and rocket weapons would be prohibited. Such a move may have figured in Khrushchev's unannounced visit to Bucharest from 19 to 25 October and the recent approach of the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade to Yugoslav President Tito. The Rumanian and Bulgarian ambassadors in Belgrade reportedly also have talked with Tito recently.

The day after Khrushchev's return to Moscow, Bucharest radio renewed the 1957 Rumanian appeal for a Balkan conference. Bloc propaganda is continuing to refer to "favorable conditions for inter-Balkan collaboration" and has recalled the earlier Rumanian "initiative" for a conference and Khrushchev's proposal for an atom-free zone. There has been only mild propaganda reaction, however, to reports that Turkey will soon agree to the establishment of NATO missile bases on its territory, in contrast to the flood of sharp statements, notes, and speeches that followed reports in April and May of NATO plans for missile bases in Italy and Greece. On 30 October, TASS reported without comment that "detailed agreement had been reached "between the United States and Turkey on erection of a "rocket base."

Early last summer Moscow formally proposed a Balkan-Adriatic "zone of peace" to include the Balkan satellites, Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, and Italy. According to the plan, the United States, Britain, and France would join the USSR in "guaranteeing the security and independence of the countries in the zone." Rumania on two previous occasions has taken the lead in introducing proposals for a Balkan conference and would be the logical choice for renewing the offer.

While bloc leaders probably would expect nonbloc countries to reject this bid for a conference, they may think that renewal of such an overture, coming just before an official Turkish announcement on missile bases, would serve to "justify" countermeasures such as establishing Soviet missile bases in the Balkans.

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25X1

### Drought Intensifies Satellite Problems

A serious drought in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland of over two months' duration has been hampering fall planting and is threatening the winter wheat and rye crops, which account for about 60 percent of the total grain output of these countries. The drought is also affecting the current harvests of potatoes, sugar beets, and fodder. Output of dairy products has been reduced. East German Premier Grotewohl called a special meeting "to ensure the food supply," and the Polish party central committee held an extraordinary plenum to discuss the subject.

It is unlikely that any losses of winter grain could be made up in spring planting. The result would probably be a further decline in stock breeding, with particularly heavy impact on Poland, where the population has already shown its irritation over a six-month meat shortage. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany normally import about 4,500,000 tons of grain annually, largely from the USSR. Grain imports will probably have to be increased substantially.

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Ceylon's New Prime Minister Survives First Crucial  
Parliamentary Vote

The position of new Prime Minister Dahanayake's government remains vulnerable despite the ruling group's defeat on 30 October of a no-confidence motion by 48 votes to 43. Dahanayake is assured of remaining in power at least for a short period, but serious cabinet dissension and growing public awareness of charges implicating top government officials in former Prime Minister Bandaranaike's assassination cast doubt on his ability to retain his position throughout the remaining 18 months of the present government's term.

The division of votes on the no-confidence motion indicates that the government mustered its total voting strength, while the combined opposition suffered four abstentions. The ruling party's winning of this particular vote thus resulted primarily from the continued reluctance of certain leftist opposition members to oust the government and face elections, as well as from the support of six government-appointed members and two independents. Future votes probably will involve similar uncertainties.

In addition to dealing with the difficulties of the political situation he inherited, Dahanayake will also have to prove as capable a party leader as Bandaranaike and try to improve on the former prime minister's handling of long-standing economic and communal problems. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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